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Sochi and the 2014 olympics: Game over? 
Ed
ito
ri
al
We are going to build a new world-class resort for the new Russia – and the 
whole world!” thus was the promise of Vladi-
mir Putin when he made the pitch for the 2014 
Winter Olympic Games in front of the Inter-
ȱ ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ 	ȱ
in 2007. His speech, delivered in English and 
french, did not fail to impress, nor did the oil- 
and gas-fuelled record growth rates in excess 
of 8% that Russia logged in 2006 and 2007. 
the IOC members awarded Russia the much-
coveted prize of becoming an Olympic host 
city, snubbing contenders Salzburg and Py-
eongchang. Not mincing words, the Russian 
newspaper Vedomosti put what it perceived as 
ȱȱĴȱ¢Ǳȱȃȱ ȱ
got convinced that there is a lot of money in 
Russia – that it becomes more and more – and 
that this man [Putin] controls it, whatever com-
pany it may formally belong to” (Vedomosti 
2007). the order was a tall one: Sochi did not 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱ
an Olympic competition. thus, it proposed to 
build all 14 major venues from scratch, plus a 
list of more than 200 objects to be constructed 
as ancillary infrastructure. the Olympics were 
meant to become a game changer on Russia’s 
road to big push modernisation. 
fast-forward six years and six months to 
the present day. Sochi is covered in dust as 
workers toil in three shifts 24/7 on what is one 
of the largest construction sites in the world 
ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱ
opening ceremony on 07 february 2014. from 
an initial estimate of USd 12 billion, costs have 
skyrocketed fourfold to USd 50 billion. and 
ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱȱ
chasing records goes, this is probably the sad-
dest one: the most expensive Olympics ever, 
Summer or Winter – even though the size and 
infrastructure requirements for the Winter 
Games are by numbers of magnitude smaller 
when compared to the Summer Games. a 
recent initiative, spearheaded by Boris Nem-
cov, unveiled some grotesque cost-overruns: 
the ski jumps, for example, came in at almost 
seven times the initial cost projection (Nem-
cov and Martynjuk 2013). What is more, nu-
merous lucrative contracts were awarded to 
cronies of ruling elites, driving up costs even 
further and signalling the self-serving char-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ
ungovernability of the event, the chief of the 
state company responsible for delivering the 
construction for the Winter Games, Olimpstroj, 
was replaced three times in four years. 1.5 mil-
ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȃ
 ȱ
much did they steal at the Olympics in Sochi?” 
ǻʈˊ˓ˏ˪ˊ˓ȱ ˙ˊ˕ʲˏˆȱ ˑʲȱ ʅˏˆː˔ˆʲʹʺȱ ʵȱ ʈ˓ˣˆǵȱ
2013) indicate to what degree the misman-
agement of the Olympic Games has become a 
public issue.
yet, the greatest costs of this gargantuan 
project are not monetary. Originally conceived 
as an event for the people, the Sochi Olym-
pics have become anything but. Promises of 
modernization and improvements of quality 
of life ring hollow with the local population, 
 ȱȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱǻûȱ
ŘŖŗŘǼǯȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱ
relations between the local people and the ad-
ministration (Karbainov 2013). Construction 
activities have blighted the protected areas in 
which construction was rubberstamped with 
the help of a special decree. Commitments to 
host the greenest Games ever, enshrined in the 
bid book and communicated to the public as a 
ǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ
ǻȱĴȱȱǰȱȱǲȱû-
ler 2014). 
this is the backdrop against which the 
four contribution of this special issue are set. 
Bo Petersson and Karina Vamling (both at 
Malmö), who have also edited a book on the 
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subject (Petersson and Vamling 2013) open 
the suite of papers with an examination of 
how the Sochi Games are utilised in Russia’s 
quest for great power status and how they are 
designed to shore up legitimacy for Putin’s 
role as a Russian leader. Emil Persson (also 
Malmö) considers the image component of the 
Sochi Games and the tensions behind the pro-
jection of a harmonious, multi-ethnic nation. 
this is of particular relevance given the out-
right refusal to recognise or  address historical 
wrongs done to the Circassian nation during 
and after the Caucasus wars in the area of So-
chi (Richmond 2013). the prospects for civil 
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ
ęȱȂȱ ǻȱȱǯǯǼȱ
contribution. the preparation for the Winter 
Games has provided ample opportunities for 
people to voice dissent – all too often, howev-
ǰȱȱĴȱǯȱȱĴȱȱȱ
conclude on a hopeful note, highlighting that 
activism has been able to stall at least some 
ǯȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱȱȱ
(St. Petersburg) takes us down to earth with 
his meticulous investigation of the divergent 
development of two villages that are caught 
in the middle of the Olympic development 
frenzy in Sochi – yet fall by the wayside at the 
same time. the contributions demonstrate the 
ȬĴȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ	ȱȱ
Sochi, but also drive home the point that what 
was envisioned as a game changer is close to 
turning into the opposite: game over. 
Martin Müller (Zürich)
November 2013
About the Editor
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by Bo Petersson & Karina Vamling, Malmö University, Sweden
display Window or tripwire? the Sochi Winter Games, the russian 
Great power ideal and the legitimacy of vladimir putin 
abstract  President Vladimir Putin’s claim and policies to resurrect Russia as a great power have been a 
cornerstone for the construction of the hegemonic position of power that he has for so long successfully exerted 
and upheld. This paper discusses the Russian great power ambitions in relation to national identity and popu-
lar appeal, and puts them in relation to the upcoming Winter Games in Sochi in 2014. The paper examines 
how this mega-event is discursively constructed as a manifestation of Russia’s return to great power status, 
and as such is meant to convey certain messages internally as well as externally. The successful carrying out 
of the Games would no doubt constitute an important component in the undergirding of the – otherwise dwin-
dling – legitimacy of President Putin. The event would be an important display window for manifesting the 
prowess of the Russian great power, and the location of the Games in Sochi by the Caucasian Mountains in the 
Russian South would have a deeply symbolical aspect. If the Games can be successfully carried out in a region 
that has for so long been experienced as volatile and unruly, then it must surely mean that internal order has 
been restored in the Russian great power. However, it is argued in the article that there are several potential 
tripwires on the way towards achieving these symbolically important goals. Problems of security, terrorism, 
geopolitical volatility, large-scale corruption and interethnic tension loom large, and may all turn out to be 
formidable obstacles and render the hosting of the Games a counter-productive enterprise.
ȱџіћєіћєȱѡѕђȱљѦњѝіѐȱ	юњђѠȱѡќȱ
ќѐѕіǱȱѝѝќџѡѢћіѡіђѠȱюћёȱіѡѓюљљѠȱ
Pȱȱęȱȱȱ-paigning have become increasingly com-
monplace when determining the location of 
prestigious international sports events (Mar-
kovits & Rensmann 2010). the successful Rus-
sian campaign for bringing the Olympic Win-
ter Games in 2014 to Sochi was certainly no 
exception. Indeed, the Sochi Games have been 
characterized as President Vladimir Putin’s 
ȃȱȄȱǻûȱŘŖŗŗǰȱŘŖşśǼȱȱȱȱ
through of the project would probably have 
been inconceivable without him. Putin headed 
the Russian delegation to the Guatemala City 
IOC meeting in 2007 where the decision was 
made to let the Russian federation and Sochi 
arrange the Olympic Winter Games. His ad-
dress to the IOC – delivered in English and 
french – is believed to have played a crucial 
role in the process, not least his demonstra-
tion of highest-level political commitment to 
the project. Putin’s speech included a power-
ȱ ȱęȱȱȱŗŘȱȱȱ
dollars (youtube 2007). this made, already at 
this stage, the Sochi Games the most expen-
sive Winter Olympics ever in the history of the 
Olympic movement (Müller 2011, 2095). for 
his part, Vladimir Putin has also on numerous 
earlier occasions shown himself to be keenly 
interested in personally promoting mega-
events organized in and by Russia. When Rus-
sia was hosting the Eurovision Song Contest 
in 2009 he made e.g. a point of appearing per-
sonally on site to see to it that the preparations 
were in order (avellan 2010). 
On a more general level, the Sochi Winter 
Games are, just like other mega-events to be 
hosted by Russia such as the fIfa World Cup 
in football in 2018, prone to provide a stage 
for the delivery of the message that Russia has 
once again resumed its role of great power in 
the contemporary world. With his domestic le-
gitimacy dwindling, as it was suggested dur-
ing the long series of urban protests in connec-
7Euxeinos 12 (2013)
Bo Petersson, Karina Vamling
tion with the parliamentary elections of 2011 
ȱȱȱȱȱŘŖŗŘȱǻ ȱŘŖŗŘǲȱ
Shevtsova 2012), the Sochi Winter Games may 
prove to be a welcome opportunity for Putin to 
display strength and resolve and demonstrate 
that his is still a much needed strong hand at 
the helm. as it has been suggested in the schol-
arly debate, Putin may otherwise run the risk 
of being compared to his Soviet-time succes-
sors during the Brezhnev period of stagnation 
in the 1970s and early 1980s rather than being 
associated with strength and dynamic power 
ǻȱŘŖŗŘǲȱ	ȱŘŖŗřǰȱŗŞŘǼǯȱ
It might well be that the Sochi Games will 
provide Putin with the stage that he has been 
looking for to deliver his message. However, it 
will be argued in this article that the endeavor 
amounts to a high-risk gamble, and that sev-
eral contextual factors may collude to render 
the enterprise of shoring up Putin’s legitimacy 
through the Olympics counter-productive. In 
turn, we will consider the areas of economy 
and corruption, interethnic relations, and se-
curity to illustrate that several tripwires may 
get in the way for the realization of the Presi-
dent’s ambitions. 
ѐќћќњѦȱюћёȱќџџѢѝѡіќћ
apart from the state guarantees men-
ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Games has been bolstered by private initia-
tive. from early on there was a keen interest 
among Russia’s wealthiest business circles to 
make private investments in the Sochi region. 
the billionaire Vladimir Potanin, head of the 
Interros holding company, promised that his 
company would invest $1.5 billion into dif-
ferent projects in the region (Ivanov 2007). 
Oleg deripaska, the owner of the Russian in-
vestment fund Basic Element and a personal 
friend of Putin’s, bought 100% of the state-
owned Sochi International airport in 2006 
(RIa Novosti 2006). Roman abramovich, an-
ȱ  Ȭ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ǰȱ
has also helped to fund the bid for the Sochi 
Olympics. However, while the backing by 
these actors goes a long way towards provid-
ȱęȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
for allegations about shadowy commercial in-
terests which relegate sports to the back seat, 
and about murky business deals, covert hand-
shakes and corruption. Nonetheless, from the 
estimates of critical analysts it would seem as 
all sources of revenue will be sorely needed. 
thus, with half a year remaining to the 
opening of the Winter Games many observ-
ers note the extremely high costs involved in 
the construction works. according to Vladi-
mir dmitriev, head of the Vneshekonombank, 
the costs of some Olympic objects will exceed 
initial calculations by two or three times, and, 
added to this, almost half of the objects will 
ȱ ęȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŗřǼǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ
huge rise in overall costs, it has frequently not 
ȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱ-
cording to schedule. Vladimir Putin has cer-
tainly tried to project an image of a true mover 
and shaker, coaxing and cajoling the contrac-
tors at Sochi to deliver according to plan. at an 
inspection trip in 2012 he warned: 
After the journalists leave, I will tell you what 
failures to meet the deadlines will amount to. I do 
ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱ
(Putin 2012a). 
ȱęȱȱęȱ¢ȱ
or even embezzlement and fraud seems, how-
ever, to be one that not even Putin is likely to 
win. for instance, the RusSki Gorki Olympic 
ski jump complex was far behind schedule 
8Euxeinos 12 (2013)
at President Putin’s inspection of the Olym-
pic sites in february 2013, i.e. one year before 
the opening of the Games. this led to the dis-
missal of the vice president of Russia’s Olym-
ȱĴȱ ǻȬȱ ŘŖŗřǼǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŘŖŗřȱ
and to secure the preparations for the Games, 
Putin set up a special state commission under 
deputy Prime Minister dmitrii Kozak to de-
liver the Games according to plan (RIa No-
vosti 2013).
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
Subtropics” the oppositional politician Bo-
ris Nemtsov and his co-author Leonid Mar-
tynyuk (2013) compare the Sochi Olympics 
with previous Games and discuss possible 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ
costs. President Putin’s initial estimation in 
2007 was as mentioned a record USd 12 bil-
lion but the total bill will according to the au-
thors probably be around 50 billion, i.e. more 
than four times higher. It is of course common 
that initial cost estimates do not hold, but as 
Nemtsov and Martynyuk argue, the cost in-
creases in the case of the Sochi Olympics are 
exceptional and dramatic. Likewise, the costs 
of Olympic stadiums or other objects are ap-
proximately 2.5 times higher in Sochi than for 
comparable constructions at previous Games. 
Nemtsov and Martynyuk conclude:
[T]he price tag of the Sochi Olympics without 
theft would be USD 50 billion divided by 2.5. The 
cost of the Sochi Olympics without theft would thus 
amount to USD 20 billion. This means that USD 
30 billion were stolen. …Thus, the overall scale of 
theft was around USD 25-30 billion, or 50-60% of 
ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱ-
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ
It is not only economic malfeasance that 
makes the costs run sky-high, however. the cli-
mate conditions make the construction works 
complicated, especially at high altitudes. due 
to these severe conditions, the alpine Olympic 
village built by Gazprom was not expected 
to be ready until October 2013 (RIa Novosti 
2012). also, the mountain river of Mzymta has 
breached its banks and a protection dam re-
ȱȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
sites (R-sport 2013a). 
 
ћѡђџђѡѕћіѐȱџіѝѤіџђѠ 
In contemporary Russia interethnic ten-
sions are a growing problem, as discussed in a 
recent article by President Putin (2012b): 
The reality of today is growth in interethnic 
and interfaith tension. Nationalism and religious 
intolerance are becoming the ideological base for the 
most radical groups and trends. 
Xenophobic sentiments, mostly in rela-
tion to persons from the Caucasus and Central 
asia, are markedly strong in Russia, not least 
in Moscow. a poll conducted by Romir in May 
2013 shows that 70% of the respondents in the 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ
ȱ Ȅȱ ȱ ŝřƖȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
ȄȱǻȱŘŖŗřǼǯȱȱȱęȱ
of these slogans is self-explanatory, the argu-
ȱȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ
withheld from North Caucasus which should 
thus be left to its own devices.  
It has been of vital importance for Presi-
dent Putin to retain the initiative in dealing 
with ethnic issues. against this background 
he has established the Presidential Council 
of Interethnic Relations (President of Russia 
2012). Putin is personally chairing the council, 
where one of the goals has been to work out a 
national strategy for the solving of interethnic 
Ěȱǻ£ȱŘŖŗřǼǯȱȱ ȱȱ-
ethnic relations look like on the ground, in the 
Bo Petersson, Karina Vamling
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region where the Sochi Olympics will be or-
ganized?
Russia’s gradual conquest of the Cauca-
sus and advancement to gain control over the 
strategic Caucasus Mountains and the Black 
Sea coast has had a long history. It started in 
the 18th century and was completed in the 
mid-1860s when the indigenous population 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ ę¢ȱ ǯȱ  -
ing the Russian victory, most Circassians were 
ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ
the Circassian lands were populated by Cos-
sacks and other groups from Russia.
Krasnaya Polyana, where the last Russo-
ȱĴȱȱȱȱŗŞŜŚȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱ
the Circassians, will in 2014 be the site of the 
Olympic ski slopes. It has been decided to build 
an ethnographical cultural centre in Krasnaya 
Polyana, in connection with the Mountain 
Olympic Cluster. However, the centre will not 
be devoted to the history and background of 
the fateful events of 1864, as could otherwise 
have been expected. It will instead be called 
ȃ¢ȱȄȱȱȱȱ¡-
ȱǰȱěȱȱȱȱȱ
from all over Russia (Kavkazskii uzel 2013b). 
the organizers of the Games thus plan to put 
the ethnic and cultural diversity of Russia on 
display for the visitors in a cavalcade of color-
ful, exotic elements – centering around tradi-
tional symbols of Russian culture. Moreover, 
representatives from all over Russia partici-
ȱȱěȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ
started well ahead of the Games in events like 
ȃǯǯȄȱȱȱǻŘŖŗŘǼȱȱȱ
ȃȱ¢ȄǰȱȱȱŘŖŗŖȱȱ
2014 (Sochi.ru 2013). the approach is therefore 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĴȱȱȱ
groups from the region. On the contrary, the 
Circassians have been almost absent from 
the events with few exceptions such as a one-
month exhibition in Sochi of Circassian culture 
(Kavkazskii uzel 2013a) and the performance 
of the ensemble of Kabardinka at Russia.Park 
in London (Russia-Park News 2012). 
the Shapsugs, a Circassian group that 
traditionally have lived close to Sochi and 
ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ	ȱ
ȱǰȱ  ȱęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
recognized as an indigenous people of the re-
gion (Kapaeva 2012). the Shapsugs have ap-
proached the Governor of the Krasnodar Krai, 
aleksandr tkachev, with demands for recog-
nition, but so far to no avail (dzutsev 2013b). 
Notably, the year of 2014 marks the 150th 
anniversary of the Russian conquest of the 
Caucasus, adding as it were insult to injury. 
the way the Circassians see it, the Olympic 
objects are literally constructed on the graves 
of their fallen ancestors. these facts have had 
ȱ£ȱěȱȱ ȱȱ-
ra, which has organized protests against the 
carrying out of the Olympics on their sacred 
lands. Paradoxically, the staging of the So-
chi Winter Games, an event that the Circas-
sian organizations in the diaspora claim that 
¢ȱ ȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱ
ȱȱǲȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ
limelight as seldom before and as they will 
certainly not do again for a long time to come. 
this is the chance that they will get to make 
ȱ ȱǲȱȱȱ	ȱȱȱ¢ȱ
will risk returning to the status of an interna-
¢ȱ ĴȬ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱ
basically had until just a few years ago (funch 
Hansen 2013). this is in itself an angle worth 
looking into in future research: what will hap-
pen after the visit of the circus to town? 
Under all circumstances, the Games have 
had a mobilizing and unifying effect on the 
Circassians in Russia as well as the Circassian 
diaspora in turkey and the US. as tiago fer-
reira Lopes (2013) underlines:
Bo Petersson, Karina Vamling
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Circassian activists need to decide if the Sochi 
Winter Olympics 2014 are the end game, or just 
the commencement of a new game. Circassians 
have earned a lot of social capital that should not 
be disbanded solely because the goals towards the 
Sochi Winter Olympics might not be achieved. 
Presumably, the development in countries 
in Russia’s vicinity that harbor a large Circas-
sian diaspora will have an impact on the situa-
tion in Russia’s North Caucasus. the question 
of allowing a repatriation of Circassians to the 
Caucasus has been an issue during the whole 
post-Soviet period but it has recently received 
ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱĚ ȱ
of refugees from Syria. the so far largely nega-
tive Russian stance on the issue has been a fur-
ther source of Circassian disappointment and 
frustration (Polandov 2013). 
ђѐѢџіѡѦȱѕюљљђћєђѠ 
Sochi is situated by the foothills of the 
Caucasus Mountains. Since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the 
three independent South Caucasian states of 
Georgia, armenia and azerbaijan, territorial 
ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěǰȱ -
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱęǯȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  Ȭ ȱ Ěȱ
to date are the two protracted and violent 
Chechen wars 1994–1996 and 1999–2009, as 
well as the short but eventful Russo-Georgian 
war of 2008. 
as a consequence of the Chechen wars, 
instability has increased on a general scale in 
the area and spread to other republics of the 
predominantly Muslim and ethnically diverse 
ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ĵȱ
and other forms of violence, not only against 
the authorities, have become a part of every-
¢ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ
Sochi Olympics has been highlighted by many 
ǯȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ
years in sites such as the domodedovo air-
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴ-
uted to the Chechen connection, as has been 
the terrorist bombing of the Boston Marathon 
ȱŘŖŗřǯȱ ȱ ȱĴȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ
sites as remote from the Caucasus as Moscow 
and indeed Boston there is reason to fear their 
appearance also in and around adjacent Sochi. 
In the summer of 2013 doku Umarov, the 
self-proclaimed Emir of the so-called Cau-
casus Emirate and the leader of the Islamist 
resistance in North Caucasus, made a video 
proclamation targeting the Sochi Olympics. In 
this video he urges his followers to do their 
outmost to disrupt the Games:
They plan to hold the Olympics on the bones 
of our ancestors, on the bones of many, many dead 
Muslims – buried on the territory of our land on 
ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
permit that, using any methods allowed us by the 
almighty Allah (cited in Bauer 2013).
ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ
Games it seems that one prominent reason for 
the choice of location is to improve the infra-
structure of the region and to give the area an 
economic boost, not only up to and during 
the Games as such but also after them. this is 
thought to provide a sustainable basis for de-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ĝȱ  ǯȱ
One can here discern the rationale of achiev-
ing sustainable development and stability in 
a region long regarded as unruly (Petersson 
2013). Krasnodar Krai, the region where Sochi 
is located in administrative terms, has itself 
seen a fair share of violence in recent years. 
the basic logic seems to be that if the economy 
could be boosted through the Olympic project, 
if jobs could be provided and the regional in-
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frastructure in Krasnodar Krai and the North 
Caucasus in general considerably improved 
(so far, however, most jobs have been created 
for guest workers), the region would become 
more thoroughly embedded in the federa-
tion structure. Massive economic investments 
 ȱ ȱę£ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ
originally set out to achieve, and money could 
buy what arms failed to enforce. If the calculus 
proves to be right, Putin will be able to live up 
to his image as a strong and resourceful lead-
er. But what if it fails, and what if the Games 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȬȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ
ęȄȱǻȱŘŖŗřǼǵȱ
With less than one year to the start of the 
Games, despite measures undertaken by the 
authorities, experts do not see a decrease in 
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Caucasus (dzutsev 2013a, Vatchagaev 2013a). 
Rather, as the Games are approaching, the 
authorities are likely to downplay reports of 
violence in the North Caucasus (Vatchagaev 
2013b). But the problem remains, and in the 
words of one analyst, the Games are likely to 
become the most security-loaded in Olympic 
history (Hedenskog 2013).
as if all this was not enough, there is also 
the more external aspect of security, with in-
ternational implications. Only some 30 kilo-
meters from the city of Sochi – and even closer 
to the sites of the Games – lies abkhazia, an 
autonomous republic of Georgia during Soviet 
times but now a de facto state recognized by 
Russia after the Russo–Georgian war in 2008. 
the proximity of the Games to this volatile 
area, and the fact that abkhazian territory 
has been used as a supply route for building 
material for the Olympic facilities, has been 
interpreted by the Georgian government as 
a provocative move by the Russians. Critical 
arguments have been heard that the Russian 
policy in this regard amounts to a step-by-step 
annexation of abkhazia and only serves to in-
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĚȬȱ-
gion (Kukhianidze 2013). 
ќћѐљѢѠіќћ
the Sochi Games are likely to be the oc-
casion for the display of Russia as an indis-
putable great power, capable of organizing 
strong, secure and maybe even brilliantly 
staged Games. the Olympics will be intended 
to mark and symbolize the comeback of Rus-
sia at the supreme world stage, and underline 
the importance of the leadership of President 
Putin in this endeavor. Indeed, it is hard to 
reach any conclusion other than that there is 
ȱ¢ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ-
nation of the Russian authorities to organize 
the Games in Sochi in spite of all problems, 
economic, interethnic, security-related and 
others. the hosting can well be interpreted 
as a show of force by the Russian authorities 
ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ
command. Seen in this context the choice of 
location is symbolic. If the Russian federation 
can host Olympic Games on the doorstep of 
a region that has for so long been ridden by 
Ěǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ
then internal order can certainly be said to 
have been successfully restored. Still, even if 
the rationale does seem clear, the undertaking 
appears to be like walking a tightrope without 
a proper safety net. the stakes are high, to say 
the least.
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tears in the patchwork: the Sochi olympics and the display 
of a multiethnic nation 
by Emil Persson, Lund University and Malmö University
яѠѡџюѐѡ ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȱ
Olympics. It is argued that the imagined community being displayed is a diverse, inclusive and tolerant na-
tion, even an international example of ethnic conviviality. The article puts this narrative in historical perspec-
tive, relating it to the mnogonatsionalnost policies of tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. This imagina-
tion, though explicitly very inclusive, rests on important exclusions and silences.  By selective exhibitions 
ȱ¢Ȭȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ
ĚȬȱȱȱȱǯ
ћѡџќёѢѐѡіќћ
a mediated mega-event like the Olympics is about much more than sports. It is 
also about imagining communities and about 
ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ
ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȃȱȱ-
longing” is not only the outside world, but 
as much or even more, the domestic public, 
those who are interpellated or solicited to be 
part of this community. during recent years, 
Olympic Games have increasingly been used 
by host nations to manifest their own ethnic 
diversity and multicultural identity. this was 
the case during the 2010 Winter Olympics in 
Vancouver, whose opening ceremony featured 
members of first Nations tribes performing 
traditional dances, as well as the 2012 Summer 
Olympics in London, projecting the image of a 
hip, multi-coloured Britain shaped by a histo-
ry of international migration. the 2014 Olym-
pics in Russian Sochi continues this trend. 
In the Olympic context, the multicultural-
ist theme feeds on an older narrative of inter-
nationalism and peaceful coexistence, which 
was one of the ideological foundations when 
the modern Olympic movement was formed 
in the late 1800s. However, the displays of 
multiculturalism which have become a natu-
ral part of contemporary Olympic Games are 
not unproblematic as they tend to rely on es-
sentialist and stereotypical exhibitions of mi-
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ-
ness” of the host nation. In addition, in their 
idyllic depiction of harmonious conviviality 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȃȄȱ
of host states and deny legacies of colonialism 
and racism, as well as ongoing discrimination 
ȱȱǻǯȱ
£ȱ
ǰȱŘŖŖŝǲȱ
ǰȱ
2003).
 the aim of this article is to examine how 
ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱȱ
ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱę¢ȱ ȱȱ
symbolic boundaries for inclusion into this 
community are being imagined. the focus 
lies on discourses of multiculturalism, multi-
nationalism and ethnic coexistence. to recon-
ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ
media coverage, advertisements, commodities 
and museum exhibitions. Much of this mate-
ȱ ȱȱȱę ȱȱȱȱ
May 2013. 
after a theoretical discussion about me-
dia-events’ role in creating belonging to po-
litical communities, a very short historical 
overview is given about nationality policies 
and discourses of multinationalism in tsarist, 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. taking depar-
ture in these discussions, the following section 
analyses Sochi-2014 as a project of belonging 
which aims to construct and spread a cer-
tain image of Russia to its citizens and to the 
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world. the main argument of the article is that 
the Sochi Olympics are used to promote an im-
age of Russia as an example of successful mul-
ticulturalism and ethnic conviviality, an image 
which however rests on important exclusions 
ȱǰȱȱȱĚȬȱ-
tories and current injustices. 
ђёіюȱђѣђћѡѠȱюћёȱяђљќћєіћє
the notion politics of belonging is used by 
ȱ ȱ ǻǰȱ ŘŖŖŜǲȱ Ȭǰȱ
2011) to frame studies of identity, boundar-
ies and social categorization in a globalized 
world. It emphasizes the political in bound-
ary-making, that the construction of commu-
ȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱĚȬȱȱ
intimately related to the distribution of power 
in society. according to Nira yuval-davis:
(t)he politics of belonging involves not only 
constructions of boundaries but also inclusion or 
exclusion of particular people, social categories and 
groupings within these boundaries by those who 
have the power to do this (2011:18).
the focus on belonging does not a priori 
tie the construction of political collectives to 
ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ -
tionality remains the major organising prin-
ciple of political communities in our days, we 
should not presuppose that this must always 
be the case, but allow for analytical openness 
as to which dimension of belonging – perhaps 
nationality, gender or religion - we should 
include in a particular study without before-
ȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ-
ing one. Belonging involves, writes floya an-
ǰȱȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱȬęȱȱȂȱ-
Ǳȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
community, to feel safe within it and to have 
a stake in the future of such a community of 
membership” (2006:21). 
the media – widely conceived – play a 
crucial role in the politics of belonging as it 
provides the space where communities are 
imagined and where we are exposed to other-
ȱ ǻǰȱŗşŞřǲȱǰȱŘŖŖŝǼǯȱȱ
creation of imagined communities is, accord-
ȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱ¢ȱȃȱȱ
of the other”, by which he means the represen-
tation of other races, cultures or social groups 
as stereotypes, reducing them to a few simple 
characteristics represented as natural, thereby 
£ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱȱěȱ
(Hall, 1997:257f). Never is the media’s impor-
tance for belonging and boundary-making 
more accentuated than during so called media 
eventsǰȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱĵȱȱȃȱ
holidays of mass communication”, monopo-
£ȱ ȱ ȱȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȃȄǰȱ
and appealing to mass audiences (dayan & 
ĵǰȱŗşşŘǱŗěǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ-
rovision, Lady di’s funeral or in my case the 
Olympics can be vital forces of social integra-
tion, reasserting the legitimacy and desirabil-
ity of particular modes of belonging to certain 
spatial imaginaries (Orgad, 2012:156). this 
does not mean that media events are always 
successful in establishing a sense of belonging, 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ
appropriate the intended messages scepti-
cally, ironically or in even more unexpected 
ways (Hepp & Couldry, 2010:12). How audi-
ences interpret and receive the narratives of 
media events lies however outside the scope 
of this paper. the focus is on the integrative 
claims of the Sochi Olympics, how it is crafted 
as a project of belonging, imagining and dis-
playing a certain version of Russia. Such an 
imagination, totalizing and idealizing, rests 
on important exclusions and silences. as an-
thias writes:  
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… the collective places constructed by imagi-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęǰȱ ȱ
losses, the absences and the borders within them. 
The notion of ‘imagining’ also refers to the ways 
in which constructions of belonging serve to natu-
£ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ¡ȱ
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȬȬǰȱ
ȱȱę¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
life. Such constructions produce a ‘natural’ com-
munity of people and function as exclusionary bor-
ders of otherness (Anthias 2006:21).
ѕђȱюњяіѣюљђћѐђȱќѓȱѢѠѠіюћȱњѢљѡіћю-
ѡіќћюљіѠњ
the idea of a community which harbours 
a multitude of cultures, languages and re-
ligions has a long history in Russia. It was a 
cornerstone in tsarist imperialism, not least 
was it a political necessity in order to get sup-
port from regional elites. In the 19th century, 
ethnographers explored and catalogued with 
great fascination habits and idioms in the vast 
empire. the celebration of cultural diversity 
¡ȱȱǰȱ ǰȱ ȱęȱ
policies aiming to create and strengthen Rus-
sian cultural hegemony. after 1917, the Bol-
sheviks intended to end Great Russian chau-
vinism and organized the new socialist state as 
a federation on ethnic principles. Every terri-
ȱ¢ȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱǰȱ
and the communists actively nurtured nation-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȃȱ
in form, socialist in content” (Slezkine, 1994). 
the SSSR has sometimes been called a country 
where multiculturalism prevailed (Malakhov, 
2000). the ethnographic inventory was inten-
ęǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ
found lacking, it was invented (Slezkine, 1994). 
despite the anti-tsarist rhetoric, however, the 
Soviet state (especially from Stalin onwards) 
in many ways continued the imperialist Rus-
sian project, as ethnic Russians where given 
ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȃȱȱȄȱ
that made up the SSSR, as symbolic big broth-
ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǻǰȱŗşşśǼǯȱ
Multinationalism (mnogonatsionalnost’) 
ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ
Russia. the civic-statist  identity (as 
opposed to the more exclusive ethnocultural 
) is supposed to encompass all ethnici-
ties living in the federation. tolerance is put 
forward as an ideal, but there is a scepticism 
against the Western concept of multicultur-
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ
correctness” with dangerous divisive conse-
quences for society (Malakhov, 2002). Putin´s 
much-cited article on the national question, 
published before the 2012 election, takes de-
parture in the alleged failure of Western mul-
ǰȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ
experience dating back to tsarist times. argu-
ing fervently against ethno-nationalist calls 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅǰȱ ȱ
writes that Russia is and must remain a mul-
tinational state, but that the ethnic Russians 
have a special role as a lead culture, holding 
together this unique civilization (Putin, 2012). 
When addressing foreign audiences (in diplo-
¢ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ
even more the multinational character of the 
country, aware that the idea of a ethnically 
diverse and multi-confessional Russia is more 
appealing to the world than a monocultural 
Orthodox-Slavic nation (Malakhov, 2012). 
as we have seen, mnogonatsionalnost’ has 
historically been tied to the Russian imperial 
project. although emphasis has shifted, the 
idea that ethnic Russians are a lead culture 
with a special mission to hold together a mul-
ȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱ¢ȱȱ
150 years. Like many forms of Western multi-
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culturalism, this ideology holds a primordial-
ist view on ethnicities as naturally given onto-
logical facts, and also presumes that ethnicity is 
the prime identity for individuals. Mnogonat-
sionalnost’ is also often reductionist, restrict-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ęȱ
characteristics like folklore (Malakhov, 2012). 
Putin´s words about ethnic Russians as a lead 
culture indicate that Russian multinationalism 
is highly susceptible to a critique which some 
postcolonial scholars have directed against 
Western multiculturalism: that it is an ideol-
ogy hiding ethnocentric values behind univer-
ȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȃȄȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ
as long as it can be accommodated within the 
norm and does not disrupt the master narra-
tives of society (Bhabha, 1990:208).
ђљђяџюѡіћєȱёіѣђџѠіѡѦȱѤіѡѕȱќѐѕіȬ2014
Russia will show the visitors of the Games the 
best of Russian (rossiiskoi) culture
ȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ Ĵȱȱ
a map of Russia with an artistically designed 
 ȱĴǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ -
ment campaign distributed on television, In-
ternet, as well as on huge outdoor tV screens 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱę ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ
ŘŖŗřǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ
about Sochi-2014 which is being disseminated 
most consistently – in the rhetoric of politi-
ȱȱ¢ȱĜǰȱȱȱ
and slogans, in the merchandise products de-
signed for the Games – is that Russia is a cul-
turally diverse, tolerant and open country. In 
ȱȱȃȄȱȱȱĜȱ ȱȱ
Sochi-2014, we can read that the Games will 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ
ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
diversity” (sochi2014.ru a). President Vladi-
mir Putin, who since the start has invested 
much personal prestige in the Olympic proj-
ect, expressed a similar idea in a speech in 
June 2013:
ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱ-
tion in 2014, a festival of sport, deserving of its 
ȱǱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
 ȱ¢ȱęȱȱȬȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱ
ȱȱ¢ (sochi2014.ru b).
a recurring metaphor for ethno-cultural 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȃ Ȅǯȱ
ȱȱȱȱ£ȱĴǰȱȱ
Chernyshenko, has said that the cultural pro-
gram of Sochi-2014 is devoted to 
ǳȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ
richness of Russia, and to involve all residents in a 
grand celebration (…), show the world the “patch-
 Ȅȱ ǻloskutnoye odeyalo) of cultural tradi-
tions in our country (sochi2014.ru c).   
ȱŗǯȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȬŘŖŗŚ
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the image-language used in connection 
to Sochi-2014 tells the same story. advertise-
ǰȱ Ěȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ
merchandise in the form of clothes, keyrings, 
stamps, bags etc make use of the patchwork 
ĴȱǻȱȱŗȬŘǼǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ
diversity. 
In a similar vein, the Olympic torch is used 
to imagine a multinational community of be-
longing. during 2013 Russian state television 
and popular newspapers such as -
ya Pravda focused extensively on the selection 
process of torch-carriers from each of the 83 
territorial units in Russia. We can expect that 
during the months preceding the Games, me-
dia images of the Olympic torch being carried 
¢ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ-
ery part Russia, from the arctic ice to the bot-
tom of Lake Baikal to the top of Mount Elbrus, 
and even into space, will manifest a Russian-
ness spanning cultures, races and religions. 
It could be argued that 
the framing of Sochi-2014 
as a celebration of Russian 
diversity and tolerance is 
merely make-up intended 
for a foreign audience, an 
ęȱȱȱ¢ȱ
·ȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱ
with Russian political reali-
ties. In my view, that claim 
would be too simplifying. It 
is certainly true that since 
the late 1990s multicultural-
ism – in a depoliticized and 
commercialized version – 
has become an integral as-
pect of Olympism, and that 
displays of ethno-cultural 
diversity are now an obliga-
tory part of opening cer-
ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǻ	ǰȱĵǰȱǭȱ
Bunds, 2012). the rich use of Olympic catch-
words and citations of Pierre de Coubertin 
by the Russian hosts are part of the Olympic 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱǰȱ
say, the rhetoric of Sydney 2000 or Vancouver 
2010. However, this narrative chimes in har-
mony with the Russian mnogonatsionalnost’ 
¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱĜȱ¢ȱȱ
tsarist times, and which is a central tenet for 
the current administration. Even if the word 
ȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱ
terms by Russian politicians, the idea of cele-
brating tolerance, ethno-cultural diversity and 
conviviality will not sound strange to a Rus-
sian audience but is already an important part 
ȱ Ĝȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
around Sochi-2014 is an interesting example 
of how global and domestic narratives can re-
inforce each other. We will see below that the 
ambiguity and ambivalence characterizing 
Russia’s multinationalism, to celebrate diver-
ȱŘǯȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȬŘŖŗŚ
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sity but simultaneously reinforce an ethno-
cultural  norm, is also discernible in the 
rhetoric on Sochi-2014.
tolerance and inclusion are put forward 
as ideals not only when dealing with ethno-
ȱěǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
improving the situation for people with dis-
abilities. the Games will, it is often held, lead 
to a more accessible society with fewer physi-
cal barriers, not only regionally but nationally 
(sochi2014.ru d). Nonetheless, there are strict 
limits regarding who is included in the open-
ness promoted by Sochi-2014. Ironically, this 
project of tolerance is being launched at the 
same time as there is a nation-wide campaign 
– led by the power-holding United Russia par-
¢ȱȮȱȱȱȃ¡ȱȄǰȱ ȱ
was also the pretext used for prohibiting an 
LGBt organization to set up a Pride house 
during the Olympics (Persson, forthcoming). 
the inclusionist rhetoric of Sochi-2014 falls si-
lent when it comes to sexual orientation and 
gender identity. thus, when scrutinized, the 
universalist construction of belonging put 
 ȱ ȱĜȱȱȱ ȱȱ
Olympics is more exclusive than it appears at 
ęȱǯ
џѢѧѕяюȱћюџќёќѣȱќћѐђȱюєюіћ
The modern Olympic Games were conceived 
by visionaries who set new standards and found 
new ways for development. They believed that 
sport engenders trust and cooperation between cul-
ȱȱǯȱȱŘŖŗŚȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ ęȱ ȱ 	ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
peaceful, productive dialogue between peoples (so-
chi2014.ru a).
ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ
about Sochi-2014 is that the Games will pro-
mote understanding between peoples and na-
tions. this idea feeds on the internationalism 
underpinning Olympism. the founder of the 
modern Games, Pierre de Coubertin, hoped 
that the Olympics would bring together all 
nations of the world and contribute to peace 
and reconciliation (Coubertin, 2000). the 
¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱęȱ-
tinents, symbolize this peaceful international-
ȱǻ	ĴǰȱŘŖŖŘǼǯȱ
Interestingly however, this international-
ist theme also resembles the Soviet rhetoric 
ȱ ȃȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ǻ£ȱ ). 
during the Cold war, this phrase was used as 
guiding principle both for the ethno-federal 
design of the SSSR and for the relations be-
tween the states within the socialist world. 
as ethnic Russians had a dominant political, 
military and cultural role within the Eastern 
bloc, it is quite easy to claim that the £-
ba narodov rhetoric served imperialist aims, 
wrapping Russian interests and values in a 
more appealing package by presenting them 
as universalistic and altruistic. On many occa-
sions, this narrative was used to legitimize in-
terventionist and colonial policies (cf. Peters-
son & Persson, 2011), e.g. during the invasions 
of Czechoslovakia and afghanistan. that the 
language of internationalism can still be used 
to legitimize expansionist policies is evident 
in an interesting statement by Sergey Markov, 
a member of the State duma for the Putinist 
party United Russia, at a meeting on abkha-
zia’s role in the Sochi Olympics:
The Olympic movement is a peace movement, 
an international movement. All nations have to be 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱ£ȱǯȱȱ-
not be isolated from the Olympic Games, for the lat-
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱȱ
£ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ£ȱ
¢ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱ
the process (cited in Rytövuori-apunen, 2013).
21Euxeinos 12 (2013)
Emil Persson
the internationalism inherent in Olym-
pic ideology is state-centred, conservative and 
Ȭǯȱ ȱęȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
of dominant actors, naturalizing and depo-
liticizing the status quo and power claims of 
nation-states. at the same time, all kinds of 
counter-hegemonic actions, questioning some 
aspect or policy of the host-state, are labelled 
ȱ ȃȄȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Olympics.
When talking about the role of the 2014 
Games in promoting dialogue and reconcilia-
ȱ ȱǰȱȱęȱȱȱ
the geographic location are often mentioned. 
as many other places in the Caucasus, the 
Sochi region is home to a multitude of ethnic 
groups such as armenians, Circassians and 
Estonians. the background is very complex, 
but wars, deportations and split-and-divide 
politics are part of the picture (cf. Coene, 2010). 
ȱ Ĝȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ȭȱ -
ter of Sochi is put forward as making it espe-
cially suitable for the Olympics. at a forum 
devoted to sports and peace, the head of the 
local administration in Sochi, anatolii Pakho-
ǰȱȱǱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱ
for this forum, because it is the home of more 
ȱȱȱěȱǰȱȱȱ
Middle Eastern cultures” (sochi2014.ru e). an 
article in ¢ȱ  wrote about 
a monument being built in Sochi, consisting 
of soil from all 83 regions in Russia (Gorelov, 
2013), a story which played into the imagina-
ȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȄǯȱȱ
the portrayal of Sochi, situated at the foot 
of the Caucasus mountains, as an epitome of 
successful multiculturalism bears the potential 
ȱȱ¢ȱ Ȭȱȱ ȱ ȱȃ-
sus” (£), a word which since the 1990s 
in Russia and elsewhere has gained the con-
notations of separatism, inter-ethnic strife and 
terrorism. the diverse Caucasus could have 
been presented to the world as a place of long-
time peaceful conviviality and cultural inter-
ǰȱȱȱĚǯȱ
 ǰȱȱȱ-
rative of Sochi-2014 Sochi is not presented as 
part of the Caucasus but of Russia. In fact, the 
 ȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
I have studied. thus, we should not expect the 
Sochi Olympics to contribute to such a sym-
bolic re-inscription. 
ѕђȱѠѝђѐѡюѐљђȱќѓȱѡѕђȱќѡѕђџ
an important aspect of the imagination of 
a diverse and tolerant Russia is the display of 
ethnic minorities and local cultures. accord-
ing to Stuart Hall, we are fascinated by other-
ness, because the exhibition of other people as 
ěȱ ȱȱȱ ȱę¡ȱ-
aries and is necessary for the imagination of 
community (Hall, 1997:257f). One function 
of such displays is to delineate normality. 
By naming and pointing out certain groups, 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȃȄǰȱ
ȱřǯȱȱ¡ȱȃȱȱ
of the Circassians”
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their otherness is reinscribed and marked, and 
the ethno-cultural norm reinforced. 
In May 2013, I visited an exhibition at 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȃ-
tional culture of the Circassians” (see images 
3-4). the exhibition was presented as part of 
the cultural program of the Sochi Olympics. 
the Circassians (in Russian variously termed 
¢¢ǰȱ ¢ǰȱ ¢) are a Cauca-
sian ethnic group which ruled the Sochi area 
ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȃȱ Ȅȱ
in 1864, and have since then been to a large 
¡ȱĴȱȱǯȱȱȱȱŗśŖȱ
anniversary of what many Circassians call a 
genocide, and the fact that Krasnaya Polyana, 
where the skiing competitions will take place 
during the Olympics, was the place were tsar-
ist forces celebrated the defeat of independent 
ǰȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ Ȃȱ Ȅȱ
(dzutsev, 2011) has been revived by the Olym-
pics. Sochi-2014 has mobilized Circassians 
abroad and in Russia to call 
for genocide recognition, 
and in some cases for an 
ȱ¢Ĵȱ ǻ
-
sen, 2013). Simultaneously, 
the uprisings in Libya and 
Syria, two countries with 
large Circassian minorities, 
have led to a debate about 
whether Circassians whose 
ancestors were deported 
in the 19th century should 
have the right to return to 
Russia. 
these sensitive issues 
were not the topic of the 
exhibition. Instead the mu-
seum focused on traditional 
costumes, weapons, handi-
craft, musical instruments 
and jewellery. In classical 
orientalist style, the Circassians were pictured 
as a noble but uncivilized tribal people, con-
sisting of belligerent proud men and exoti-
cally charming veiled women1. the history of 
the Circassians in the Sochi region was traced 
back thousands of years, and maps showed 
the extension of Circassia in the 19th century. 
there was no mention of colonial wars, depor-
tations, refugees or current Circassian claims 
for recognition. 
the museum exhibition is a good exam-
ple of how, by selective narrations, the other is 
domesticated and reduced to kitsch and folk-
ǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ĚȬȱ ȱ ȱ
prevailing inequalities are glossed over. at the 
1  Such representations of a symbolic ”East” 
(a role played alternately by the Caucasus, Central 
asia, and the far East), have a long tradition in 
Russian cultural history, spanning from Pushkin’s 
and tolstoy’s romantic tales of mountain savages, 
to Soviet cinema and contemporary works of 
ȱȱǻǯȱ¢ȱŗşşśǲȱȱŘŖŖŚǼǯ 
ȱŚǱȱȱ¡ȱȃȱȱȱȱȄ
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same time a norm is reinforced: by picturing 
ȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
tradition, the Russian self emerges as civilized 
and progressive (cf. Oye, 2010). at the time of 
writing, the Olympic opening ceremony in 
2014 still lies ahead, but my guess is that we 
ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȃȱ -
sity”, celebrating the otherness of minority 
ǰȱȱȱȱęǰȱ¢ȱȱ
depoliticizing way, stripping them of any dif-
ference or history which cannot be accommo-
dated within the master narrative.
ќћѐљѢёіћєȱџђњюџјѠ
this article has examined a particular me-
dia event – the Sochi Olympics – as a project 
of belonging, imagining and displaying a Rus-
sia which is diverse, tolerant and inclusive, 
whose history of ethnic conviviality makes 
it an example of successful multiculturalism. 
the narrative makes use of Olympic clichés of 
the kind obligatory at every Olympic Games 
 ¢ǰȱȱȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ-
ęȱ¢ȱȱȂǰȱ ȱ
has been a legitimizing principle for the Rus-
sian state since tsarist times. despite a univer-
salist language, ethnic Russians are awarded 
a normative status in this multinational com-
munity, e.g. through displays of the otherness 
ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ  ȱ
into the ideological stance of the current Rus-
sian administration that ethnic Russians are a 
lead culture holding together a unique civili-
zation. Recalling what floya anthias writes 
about how imaginations of belonging gloss 
ȱ ęǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
 ȱȱǻŘŖŖŜǱŘŗǼȱȱĜȱȱȱ
Sochi-2014 operates according to this logic of 
depoliticization. Political and social contin-
gencies are subsumed into an image of com-
pletion, harmony and taken-for-grantedness. 
the Russia which is imagined and displayed 
– inclusive, tolerant, multicultural and peace-
striving – is just there, emptied from contra-
ȱ ȱ Ěǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ
however, reveals silences and exclusions in 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱęȱ
in and therefore can expose the limits and in-
coherencies of Russia’s Olympic dream. 
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the 2014 Sochi olympics and russia’s civil Society
яѠѡџюѐѡȱȱThis article examines the impact of mega-events on civil society. Based on a case study of the 2014 
Sochi Olympics, it concludes that mega-events provide a way for state-business alliances to impose their de-
ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ
ęȱ ȱȱȱĚȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ¢ǰȱȬȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ
£ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱǯȱ
What is the relationship between civil society groups and the organizers of 
mega-events such as the Olympics? activ-
ȱ ȱ ȱęǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
them, have come to mutually contradictory 
conclusions. One side focuses on how civil so-
ciety groups can use the massive investment 
made in the Olympics by others as a platform 
through which they can hijack the interna-
tional media spotlight to promote progressive 
change that the event organizers did not plan 
(Price, 2008). the other side argues that mega-
events work in just the opposite way – allow-
ing states and corporations to limit the input 
of civil society while they take advantage of 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱ¢ȱ
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ
oversight or scrutiny (Lenskyj, 2008). 
 ěȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ
the Olympics to promote their own agendas 
take advantage of the fact that the Games 
stand at the nexus of a country’s domestic and 
foreign policy. Olympic hosts decide to bid for 
the Games, in part, because they are interest-
ed in boosting their international image (Bur-
bank, andranovich, & Heying, 2001), which 
makes them susceptible to pressure from the 
international community. the most celebrated 
example of an Olympic event encouraging de-
mocratization was the end of military rule in 
South Korea just before the 1988 Seoul Games. 
Political protests in the summer of 1987 called 
into question Korea’s ability to host the games 
the next year and the unprecedented interna-
ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ -
tated the declaration of military ruler Presi-
dent Chun doo Hwan on 29 June 1987 to step 
down and call direct elections in december 
1987 (Pound, 2008). With an eye to such global 
leverage, international non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), such as Human Rights 
Watch, regularly seek to capture the media at-
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱěȱȱȱȱ
wide range of issues, including labor abuses, 
media repression, religious freedom, and civil 
liberties (Worden, 2008). the Games are also 
seen as a mechanism for promoting environ-
mental awareness and developing a green 
lifestyle in the host countries and among those 
 ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ -
ǯȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱ
are not immediately successful, the Olympics 
provide a rallying point around which civil so-
ciety organizations can develop experience to 
use in future campaigns (fors, 2009).
While the Olympics may provide civil so-
ciety groups with a platform to promote their 
causes, they also hand the state and corpora-
tions tools for limiting society’s ability to ex-
ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱ-
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able. Researchers like Bent flyvbjerg and his 
ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ¢ȱ
deception,” in which mega-projects are fre-
quently approved even though their sponsors 
ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ęǰȱ
ȱ ȱȱěǰȱȱ-
dervalue environmental impacts (flyvbjerg, 
2006). Once a city wins a bid for the Olympics, 
it has seven years to get ready. Since there is 
ȱ Ě¡¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȯȱ ȱ ȱ
Ceremony must take place at the appointed 
ȱ Ȯȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
accountability processes as they determine 
resource allocations in democratic countries 
(Lenskyj, 2008) and use the Olympic cloak to 
legimitize their actions in authoritarian coun-
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱȱ-
ity even under normal conditions. One recent 
¢ȱǱȱȃȱǰȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ
 Ȭȱ Ĵȱ ǰȱ ȱ -
ga-events, continents, and regime types. the 
Ĵȱ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱ-
fective delivery are valued more highly in 
event hosting than the values of participatory 
democracy or social justice (Hayes & Karami-
chas, 2012, p. 21).”
this article will seek to sort out these con-
testing versions of the relationship between 
civil society and mega-events in authoritarian 
conditions by examining the role of Russian 
environmental organizations in the prepara-
tions for the 2014 Sochi Olympics. When does 
ȃȄȱ  ǰȱ  ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
groups to change the narrative of the Games 
that was designed by state and corporate 
Olympic organizers for other purposes? When 
do states and corporations prevail in using 
mega-events in ways that limit the role of civil 
society? Ultimately, this article concludes that 
mega-events create opportunities that civil so-
ciety can exploit as well as new constraints on 
its activities. 
ѕђȱ љѦњѝіѐȱ њђєюȬђѣђћѡȱ юћёȱ ѠѡюѡђȬ
ѠќѐіђѡѦȱџђљюѡіќћѠȱіћȱѢѠѠію
ȱȬȱȱ¢¢ȱęȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȃȬȱ-
tural (including commercial and sporting) 
events, which have a dramatic character, mass 
ȱȱȱȱęȱ
ǻǰȱ ŘŖŖŖǼǯȄȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ
consequences for the host city, region, or 
¢ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ¡-
sive media coverage (Horne & Manzenreiter, 
2006, p. 2). the Olympics and a handful of oth-
ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȃȱ
television” audience that is both large in size, 
numbering in the billions, and includes view-
ers willing to interrupt their daily routine for 
the event (Spa, Rivenburgh, & Larson, 1995, 
p. 209). Mega-projects are the massive infra-
structure ventures, usually driven by public 
funding, associated with making such events 
possible. 
ȱȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ -
guishes it from the state and corporations 
(Cohen & arato, 1994). In particular, we focus 
on the organizations that serve as intermedi-
aries between citizens, on one side, and state 
and corporations, on the other (Henry, 2010). 
ȱęȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
useful in authoritarian Russia, where the state 
frequently works closely with chosen corpora-
tions against broader public interests.    
 typically Russia’s environmental groups 
did not have anywhere near the resources or 
organizational infrastructure of the Olympic 
backers, making their interaction asymmetri-
cal. the Olympics add to the conventional 
repertoire of the protest movement in Russia 
ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ 	ȱ
ȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱ-
zations can mobilize. Moreover, the Olympics 
provide a set of ideals that the Russian author-
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ities claim to support and the members of civil 
society can hold them to these ideals. 
 for Russia’s civil society, a central ques-
tion is to decide whether to play by the re-
gime’s rules and work inside the system or 
instead to devote their resources to pressuring 
the regime from outside, using street protests 
and other means (Kozlovsky, 2013). Partici-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ
the regime elites have stacked the rules in 
ȱ ǰȱȱ ȱ ¡¢ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ
the opposition to win a contested election or 
gain access to meaningful decision-making 
processes. Even established democracies have 
blocked access by environmental groups. In 
several Olympic cities, the organizers set up 
consultative bodies to work with civil society 
groups and incorporate their input. However, 
it is not clear whether these groups had any 
real power to make changes in the ways that 
the Games were organized or were just de-
signed to neutralize unwanted public criti-
cism. In fact, some activists charge that the 
authorities’ motivation behind establishing 
such groups is to prevent the opposition from 
having any impact on the management of the 
Games (Shaw, 2008, p. 11). Given the small 
ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ £ȱ
ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢-
temic” activities. Protests, on the other hand, 
can be dangerous for participants since they 
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱĜ-
cult to turn out people in numbers that will 
ȱȱěȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ	-
en the choice between these poor alternatives, 
most Russian citizens decide not to participate 
at all (Howard, 2002).
 In contrast to the relatively resource-de-
prived civil society organizations, the Russian 
state has an extensive tool kit that it can use 
in responding to citizen-led initiatives. these 
responses range from repression (arresting 
the key activists, forcing their emigration, or 
the use of violence against them), harassment 
(intrusive legal or regulatory investigations, 
ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ  Ǽǰȱ ȱ
(enducing groups to support regime prefer-
ences), ignoring, and even incorporating their 
input into the decision-making processes. 
ѕђȱћѣіџќћњђћѡюљȱќѣђњђћѡȱ
іћȱќѐѕі
Environmental issues present a useful test 
of whether the Olympics serve as a platform 
for civil society groups to promote progres-
sive causes or a mechanism for states and cor-
porations to circumvent such input. the IOC 
ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ-
fore the 1990s, but the 1992 albertville Games 
were an environmental disaster, prompting 
the Olympic movement to revise its policy and 
add the environment as the movement’s third 
pillar, along with sport and culture. there is 
some anticipation that having environmental 
standards could promote international norms 
ěȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ -
mestic constituencies of a cleaner environ-
ment (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012). 
the environmental stakes for the Sochi 
Olympics are high because the infrastruc-
ture construction associated with the Winter 
Olympics has a greater impact on the natural 
Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ
the Summer Games, even though the Summer 
	ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ
participants. the Winter Games take place 
in mountainous areas that are more ecologi-
cally fragile than the urban locations where 
summer events are held and usually require 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȬȱ Ĵȱ ȱ
ȱȱĜȱ ȱȱǻǰȱǰȱ
Mela, & Ropolo, 2012). Likewise, the winter 
events concentrate large numbers of people in 
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small places, which can put severe stresses on 
the surroundings. Sochi’s ecological footprint 
is bigger than for most Games because its bid 
proposed an ambitious plan that would de-
liver all new sporting facilities and extensive 
infrastructure construction, including a new 
airport terminal, construction of railway and 
roads from coast to mountains, roads in the 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ę-
cant upgrades to Sochi’s sewer and electric-
ity systems. Competitors from austria, which 
also sought to host the Games, argued that the 
use of existing structures in Salzberg would 
limit environmental impact if their site were 
chosen (International Olympic Commission, 
2007, p. 69). 
Practice has not lived up to the ideals es-
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȃ	ȱ	ǯȄȱȱ
the torino 2006 Games, organizers set up the 
Environmental Consultative assembly with 
representatives of 13 environmental organi-
zations and 10 local government institutions. 
the group was helpful in identifying problems 
with the Olympics and disseminating infor-
ǯȱ
 ǰȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ
the organization of the Games beyond reduc-
ing the number of snow-making machines to 
limit their environmental toll (dansero, et al., 
2012). an analysis of the 2000 Sydney Games 
found that the bid laid out extensive environ-
mental protections, but the New South Wales 
government legislation created loopholes and 
Ěȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ -
ing in what watchdog Green Games Watch 
ŘŖŖŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ Ȅȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ ǻĴȱ ǭȱ -
ǰȱ ŘŖŗŘǼǯȱȱ ěȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ  ȱ ȱ
them and the project managers did not have 
ȱęȱȱȱȱȱ-
ments (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012). another 
assessment found that in the cases of Sydney 
and athens 2004, the events did not leave an 
ecological legacy (Karamichas, 2012). In nei-
ther place did the Olympics result in a culture 
change or the adoption of strategies to protect 
the environment. In preparation for the 2004 
athens Olympics, Greece altered its constitu-
tion in order to limit forest protection (article 
24.1), ultimately circumscribing the power of 
environmental and citizen initiative groups 
(Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 16). Similarly, 
the Beijing Games failed to stimulate a long-
term solution to that city’s air pollution prob-
lems (Rich, 2012).
Sochi’s experience with the Games seems 
to be in line with previous Olympic experience 
regarding environmental protections: great 
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱĴȱ
implementation afterwards (Müller, 2013). In 
its bid for the Games, the Sochi organizers 
ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ -
grated and inclusive system for managing nat-
ural resources by working closely with public 
authorities and non-governmental organiza-
tions (Sochi 2014, 2007, p. 31).” However, the 
small but vocal environmental movement in 
Russia has criticized the deleterious impact 
the construction and associated activities will 
have on the natural surroundings of the city 
and the nearby ecology, including land allo-
cation, water pollution, waste management, 
ȱȱȱȱęȱȱ
use. Even before the IOC accepted Sochi’s ap-
plication to host the Games, a group of 47 en-
vironmental groups from across Russia asked 
the IOC to reject Sochi’s proposal (Kavkazskii 
uzel, 2007). the activists wrote that they had 
nothing against hosting the Games in Russia, 
but rejected the high environmental price of 
bringing the event to Sochi. they noted that 
seven venues were planned to be created in 
ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ £ȱ
to the UNESCO World Heritage Site Cauca-
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sus State Biosphere Preserve. this problem, 
combined with the lack of positive environ-
mental evaluations, the failure to take public 
opinion into account in making management 
decisions, and the violation of numerous Rus-
sian environmental laws in preparation for the 
Games formed the core of the complaints in an 
ȃȬȱȄȱȱ¢ȱȱ-
mental groups (avtonomnoe deistvie, dru-
£ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ	ǰȱȱȃ-
ktivnoe deistvie”, & Maikopskoe otdelenie 
VOOP, 2007). 
Once the bid was accepted, Sochi’s green 
movement lodged a number of complaints 
about the Games and the construction asso-
ciated with them. In evaluating the bid, the 
commission expressed hope for continued 
dialogue with environmental NGOs on litiga-
tion that they had pending against the govern-
ment. However, such state-society dialogue 
seemed unlikely in practice because the bid 
Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ ȱ
¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ
construction schedules and development of 
Olympic venues (International Olympic Com-
mission, 2007).” 
 as noted above, a central dilemma for 
environmental organizations is whether to 
work with the event organizers in the hopes 
that they can reduce the environmental impact 
or to confront it head on through protests. Ob-
servers of mega-event planning have argued 
that the process is primarily top-down and 
citizens’ participation typically consists of re-
acting to plans developed elsewhere (Hayes 
ǭȱ ǰȱ ŘŖŗŘǰȱ ǯȱ ŘŘǼǯȱ ȱ  ȱ Ĵȱ
citizen input in the U.S. games held in Los an-
geles, Salt Lake City or atlanta (Burbank, et 
al., 2001). In the case of Sochi, public opinion 
polling shows that participation and consulta-
tion in planning have been marginal and lo-
cal support for the Games has shrunk from 86 
percent in October 2006 to 57 percent by No-
vember 2010 (Müller, 2012). In spite of their 
promises to cooperate, the authorities ignored 
the main requests of the environmentalists. 
already in 2008 the Ministry of Natural Re-
sources and Ecology changed the zoning of 
the Sochi National Park to allow construction 
there (Shevchenko, 2013), a decision that was 
reinforced on July 14,  2009, when the Sochi 
City Council adopted a new general plan for 
ȱ¢Ȃȱȱęȱȱȱ
(Perova, Karpova, & aminov, 2009). 
 the big international environmental 
groups World Wildlife fund (WWf) and 
Greenpeace originally worked with the author-
ities, but subsequently became disillusioned 
with the state’s failure to follow through on 
environmental measures discussed. On July 3, 
2008, Igor Chestin, head of the World Wildlife 
fund’s Russia chapter, and Ivan Blokhov, a 
representative of Greenpeace, met with Putin 
in Sochi and he agreed to move the bobsled 
run and alpine Olympic Village from their 
planned location on the Grushev Ridge. after 
this meeting, Putin seemed to think that the 
Games would now have the environmental-
ists’ stamp of approval and deputy Prime 
Minister aleksandr Zhukov declared that the 
organizations had no more claims against the 
Sochi sites (Naumov, 2008).
 However, what seemed like a good start 
quickly fell apart. By 2010 the relationship 
had turned adversarial because the WWf felt 
that decisions agreed to at meetings with the 
authorities simply were not enforced (World 
Wildlife fund, 2010a). the group noted, in 
particular, that the construction of the com-
bined road/railroad from adler to Krasnaya 
Polyana, the largest infrastructure project of 
tȱ¢ȱěȱ ȱȱȱǞŜȱǰȱ
ȱ ȱȱĜȱ¢ȱȱȱ-
vironmental impact. at that time, the United 
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Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
warned that the organizers were not doing 
enough to compensate for the environmen-
tal damage that the construction was causing 
(United Nations Environmental Programme, 
ŘŖŗŖǼǯȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ
a dialogue between the environmental NGOs 
and the authorities in October 2010 failed, 
according to WWf, Greenpeace, Ecological 
Watch on the Northern Caucasus (a group 
that had consistly opposed the authorities) 
ȱ ȱ ȱ £ǰȱ ȱ ȃȱ
with previous Missions, the bureaucrats either 
ignored the meetings, created obstacles for the 
participation of society, or sent people with 
no power to make decisions to the meetings 
(World Wildlife fund, 2010b).” In one case, 
the bureaucrats started a meeting that had 
been planned for 2 pm at 11 am without warn-
ing the NGOs in advance, thereby making it 
impossible for them to participate. By January 
2011 the NGOs refused to meet with UNEP be-
cause they felt that such meetings would not 
ȱ ȱȱȃȱ ȱȱ
used for the purpose of providing ‘green pub-
lic relations’ for the Olympics (World Wildlife 
fund, 2011).” 
 a major problem for the environmental 
organizations is that Russia has hollowed out 
the institutions that typically organize Olym-
pic Games, turning them into facades, and 
shifting power to other organizations that 
have even less accountability to the public 
(Robertson, 2011, pp. 194-197). In its January 
2011 mission report to Moscow and Sochi, the 
UNEP itself complained that its main part-
ner, and the institution that is supposed to be 
implementing the environmental plans, the 
ȱŘŖŗŚȱ£ȱĴǰȱȱȱȱ
Ĵȱȱȱȱȱȱ-
opment of the facilities and that real power lies 
with organizations like Olympstroy and Rus-
sian Railroads, state-controlled corporations 
 ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ
Environmental Programme, 2011).
 activists working on environmental 
issues surrounding the Russian Olympics 
risked their own personal safety. One of the 
ȱȱȱęȱȱ-
vironmental damage caused by the Olympics 
is Suren Gazaryan, who represents Ecologi-
cal Watch on the Northern Caucasus. along 
with his colleague andrei Rudomakha, he 
was detained by the authorities for several 
hours when he tried to block the illegal log-
ging of protected trees in the construction of 
the road/railroad linking adler and Krasnaya 
Polyana in august 2009 (World Wildlife fund, 
2009). Gazaryan also spoke out against the use 
of timber from the Sochi National Park and 
warned about the dangers of the dumps being 
created near Sochi. at the end of 2012, Gazary-
ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ
of a billon dollar vacation home in Krasnodar 
Krai, allegedly for Putin, and protests against 
illegal logging around the governor’s dacha1. 
 In a situation where the state authori-
ties were both the key decision makers and 
unwilling to respond to ecological concerns, 
the environmental movement largely gave 
ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
infrastructure construction around them. af-
ȱŘŖŖşǰȱȱȱȱȃȱ¢ȱ
games will never be ‘green,’ since they have 
already caused irreparable damage to unique 
ecosystems,” although they still held out hope 
ȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱ-
ther negative consequences and carry out ter-
ritorial compensatory measures (expanding 
and creating special nature preserves) (World 
1 See his blog: ĴǱȦȦ£¢Ȭǯ-
journal.com/, particularly ĴǱȦȦ£¢Ȭǯ
livejournal.com/105213.html
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Wildlife fund, 2010c).” activities by other 
groups also petered out. the Institute for Col-
lective action lists no Sochi related protests in 
2013 through august 152 though the Ecological 
Watch on the Northern Caucasus continues to 
post news of environmental damage caused 
by the Olympic construction at its website 
(ĴǱȦȦ ǯȦ) even though the Russian se-
¢ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱȬȱ
on March 27, 2013, and warned them to regis-
ȱȱȱȃȱȄȱǻ
ȱȱǰȱ
2013) under repressive anti-NGO legislation 
Russia adoped in 2012. 
 despite these overall setbacks, civil soci-
ety groups have won some victories. In one of 
the most prominent triumphs, the residents of 
Kudepsta protested against the construction 
of a gas-powered power plant from May 2012 
to april 2013. In May 2013, when it was clear 
that construction would not be completed in 
time for the Olympics, deputy Prime Minis-
ter dmitry Kozak announced that the project 
would be removed from the Olympic program 
and that all construction would be stopped 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). He claimed that 
the electricity would not be needed after all. 
Protesters were also able to block the construc-
tion of a second port that would only create 
surplus shipping capacity that could not be 
utilized (Shevchenko, 2013). Similarly pro-
tests blocked the Evraziiskii company and its 
french partner degremont from constructing 
a 4 billion ruble factory to burn sludge. the 
ęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢-
pic program and hoped to get state support. 
However, societial groups opposed the plant 
and what seemed like a sure thing in 2010 was 
cancelled in 2011, when the Russian govern-
ment declared that burning such waste was 
2 ĴǱȦȦ   ǯǯȦ¡¢ȦȦşŘ, 
accessed august 15, 2013
not ecological (Shevchenko, 2013). While all 
these cases represent victories for the envi-
ronmental groups, it is also possible that the 
organizers decided to curtail the projects for 
a variety on non-ecology related business rea-
sons because it no longer made sense to pro-
ceed with the projects. 
ќћѐљѢѠіќћ
the experience of environmental groups 
in the preparations for the Sochi Olympics 
ęȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
state and corporation interests can use a me-
ga-event to propel their pro-development in-
terests while minimizing the extent of public 
input. although Russia’s overall political cli-
mate is hostile to NGO input in public-policy 
making, the Olympic time frame and expecta-
tions of a global audience provide an excuse 
for the authorities to further curtail the role of 
civil society. In this sense, the Olympics did 
not live up to the expectations of those who 
saw the Games as a platform to promote a va-
riety of progressive causes.
 However, while the environmental 
ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ-
tions for the Games, they were able to limit the 
extent of the environmental impact by block-
ing the construction of some facilities that had 
been included in the Olympic plans. In these 
limited cases, citizen action had consequences. 
Such experience helps Russian groups to de-
velop skills and knowledge that will accumu-
ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ
future state-society relations, though, will be 
 ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱ
repressive arsenal just as quickly as the civil 
society groups learn to focus their protests.
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avtonomnoe deistvie, druzhina okhrany 
¢ȱ 	ǰȱ ȱ ȃȱ -
vie”, & Maikopskoe otdelenie VOOP. (2007). 
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life on the Ground: a comparative analysis of two villages in 
Sochi during olympic transformation
яѠѡџюѐѡȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ
event on two villages in rural Russia. The focus is on the experiences of people witnessing these changes 
ęǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŘŖŗŚȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱǰȱŗşȱ
ethnographic interviews, and government documents. Extensive interviews were conducted with Sochi locals 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ£¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱ-
gone radically divergent changes since Olympic development began, and contrasting the personal experiences 
of their inhabitants shines a light on the human element of the massive construction involved in hosting the 
world’s most prestigious mega-event. It is concluded that, while much of the infrastructure development is 
ȱȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱę¢ȱ£ǰȱ¡ȱȱȱǰȱ
ȱȱęȱȱȱȂȱǯ
ђѦѤќџёѠǱȱǲȱǲȱ¢ǲȱȬǲȱ£¢ȱǲȱ¢Ȃȱ
ћѡџќёѢѐѡіќћ
With a budget already exceeding 50 bil-
lion USd1, the Sochi Olympics represent 
unprecedented levels of investment in a rel-
atively under-populated, rural area. Major in-
frastructure improvements have been touted 
¢ȱĜȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱ
legacy of the 2014 Olympic Games: 
“By 2014 Sochi will have built and recon-
ȱȱȱřŜŖȱȱȱȱŘŖŖȱȱ
railways. New water treatment facilities are under 
construction in Krasnaya Polyana and Adler. New, 
ecologically clean power facilities are being built in 
the Mountain and Coastal Clusters. 
ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ£-
Ȭ£ȬȱȱȱȬȱȱȱ-
ply of gas for the city...The pipeline will provide 
1  thomas Grove, 2013. Russia’s $50 
billion Olympic gamble. Reuters [online], feb-
¢ȱŘŗǯȱȱǱȱǀĴǱȦȦ   ǯǯ
com/article/2013/02/21/us-russia-sochi-idUS-
BRE91K04M20130221> [accessed 21 September 
2013].
2.78 billion cubic meters of gas per year. This will 
ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
reliable energy supply for Sochi. 
The legacy of the 2014 Olympic Games in So-
ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
highways, a modern international airport, aerial 
tramways in the mountains, and a system of power 
stations.”2 
ȱĜȱȱȱȱȱ-
sion of the OlympStroy website, although less 
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ¡Ǳȱ ȃWe have 
made a long-lasting positive impact on the develop-
ment of the area. A legacy for everyone... a brand 
new infrastructure of energy, water, telecommuni-
cations and transport, international hotels...”3
further, the discussion of mega-events 
often focuses on macroeconomic results and 
2  OlympStroy evidence. O Korporatsii 
[about the Corporation]. [online]. available at: 
ǀĴǱȦȦ   ǯȬǯȦȦȦǁȱǻȱ-
tion)
3 OlympStroy evidence. about the Corpo-
ǯȱǽǾǯȱȱǱȱǀĴǱȦȦ   ǯȬǯȦ
en/about/> 
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frames the impact of development in terms 
ȱǰȱ	ǰȱȱȱęȱȱȱ-
proved infrastructure will bring to economic 
development in the region as a whole. In a 2010 
Ĝȱ ǰȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱ
president and CEO of the Sochi 2014 Organiz-
ȱĴǰȱȱȃthe Winter Games will at-
tract investment from around the world and open 
up unprecedented opportunities for the region’s 
tourist and leisure industry.”4
 this theme is evident in literature, gov-
ernment documents, and news reports con-
cerning mega-events not just in Russia, but in 
London5, China6, Rio7, and South africa (Swart 
ȱǰȱŘŖŖŚǲȱȱȱĴǰȱŘŖŗŖǼǯȱȱ
is contended here that focusing solely on the 
macro level leaves out the critical human ele-
ǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ
opinions and experiences of local residents 
adds depth and value, working toward a more 
4 ȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱŘŖŗŖǯȱȱȱ
Sochi 2014 Environment Popular Ecology News-
ĴȱǽǾǰȱȱŖŘǰȱȱŘŖŗŖǯȱȱ
ǱȱǀĴǱȦȦǯ¢Ȧŗ
ǁȱǽȱřŖȱȱ
2013].
5 ȱ¢ǯȱǯȱęȱȱ-
ȱȱŘŖŗŘȱ ȱȱǯȱĜȱ ȱ
of the Olympic Movement [online]. august 12, 
ŘŖŗŘǯȱȱǱȱǀĴǱȦȦ   ǯ¢ǯȦ Ȧ
ęȬȬȬȬŘŖŗŘȬ ȬȬ-
ing/172370> [accessed 30 October 2013].
6  Xinhua News agency evidence. Beijing 
ěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱ
Xinhua News agency [online], august 25, 2008. 
ȱǱȱǀĴǱȦȦ   ǯǯǯȦ¢Ȧ
 ȦŘŖŖŞȬŖŞȦŘśȦȏŗŜřŘŝŞşřǯǁȱǽ-
cessed 22 September 2013].  
ŝȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ
associated Press/yahoo News article [online]. July 
ŗŖǰȱŘŖŗřǯȱȱǱȱǀĴǱȦȦ¢ǯȦŗǁȱ
[accessed 30 October 2013].
comprehensive discussion of the wholesale ef-
fects inherent in mega-development. Müller 
(2012) has documented the positive and nega-
tive perceptions of Sochi residents in light of 
the preparations for the Olympic Games, and 
this paper follows in Müller’s path by pos-
ing the following research question: How 
ȱ¢ȱȬȱěȱ ȱ
lives of local people in the very center of these 
changes? By focusing on the personal obser-
ȱ ȱ ěȱ ǰȱ  ȱ ȱ -
prove our understanding of what it means to 
host major international events, particularly 
in rural areas where the necessary infrastruc-
ture development is more noticeable and the 
social, economic, and ecological changes are 
more drastic. 
 this paper focuses on the micro level of 
individuals and families in two neighboring 
ȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱěȱ¢ȱ
Olympic-related development. these two vil-
lages, spatially and socially linked by a small 
footbridge over a river, have had a close, in-
tertwined, parallel history. Since Olympic 
construction began, however, the two villages 
have undergone radical, divergent develop-
ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ
infrastructure caused by their geographical lo-
cation. through detailed interviews with resi-
dents of these villages, a critical examination 
is developed of this fragmentation, framed in 
the lives and experiences of the people who 
are quite literally hosting this international 
ǯȱ ȱĴȱȱ ȱ ȱ-
vations and opinions shows the divergent 
ways in which Olympic development has al-
tered regular life, underscoring their percep-
tions of the uneven distribution of resources, 
and ultimately helping craft a more complete 
understanding of what it means to host a ma-
jor international sporting event in a rural area. 
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ђєюȬѣђћѡѠȱюћёȱюџєіћюљіѧюѡіќћ
ȱȱ ěȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
marginalized populations is well-document-
ed. Under the pressure of an internationally-
visible deadline, host countries often conduct 
ȱ ȃęȄȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
impoverished local populations are displaced 
or hidden, and the international community 
has been guilty of failing to examine this ten-
¢ȱ ǻ	ǰȱ ŘŖŖřǼǯȱ	ě¢ȱ ǻŘŖŗŖǼȱȱ-
tailed the radical transformation of land, the 
rapid construction of infrastructure networks, 
ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ Ĵȱ  ȱ
access to resources, and the lack of legal re-
course to people displaced or aggrieved by 
Ȭǯȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ
(2011) have highlighted the contrast between 
the positive perceptions of the Olympics and 
the real-life consequences for homeless youth 
in the urban environments of Vancouver and 
London. In the context of this scholarship, this 
ȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
heart of Russian Olympic construction and 
investigates the reactions and opinions of the 
people there.
   
	ђќєџюѝѕіѐюљȱќѐѢѠ
 Visitors to the 2014 Winter Olympic 
Games in Sochi will arrive either at the re-
furbished international airport or at the 
newly-constructed train station, both located 
in adler, a district or sub-city of Sochi. the 
Coastal Cluster of Olympic sites has been built 
near these transportation hubs, but the Moun-
tain Cluster lies approximately 40km away in 
the town of Krasnaya Polyana, at an altitude 
of 550m (1800 ft) above sea level. Until recent-
ly, there was only one road connecting adler 
to Krasnaya Polyana, running into the moun-
tains alongside the Mzymta river. as part of 
the development of Olympic infrastructure, 
a federal highway was built on the opposite 
side of the river, and a dedicated rail service 
between the clusters will be completed in time 
for the Olympic Games in february. 
 although the entire city of Sochi and its 
districts are undergoing intensive construc-
tion and renovation, the focus of this investi-
gation is on Kazachiy Brod and akhshtyr’, two 
small villages on opposite sides of the Mzymta 
river, situated 15km from the Coastal Cluster 
of Olympic sites in adler and approximately 
30km from the Mountain Cluster of sites in 
figure 1. Kazachiy Brod and akhshtyr’, between the two clusters of Olympic sites in Sochi, Russia
Sven daniel Wolfe 
39Euxeinos 12 (2013)
Krasnaya Polyana. Every spectator and athlete 
will pass these villages repeatedly during the 
	ǲȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
way to travel between the Olympic Clusters. 
figure 1 shows the location of Kazachiy Brod 
and akhshtyr’ in relation to adler, Sochi, and 
the rest of Europe. figure 2 shows a snapshot 
of Kazachiy Brod in 2013. Every house vis-
ible in the picture was built after 2007. figure 
3 shows houses in akhshtyr’ surrounded by 
new power towers, along the construction 
road that leads through the village to the new 
quarry. 
юџюљљђљȱіљљюєђѠǰȱіѣђџєђћѡȱђѣђљ-
ќѝњђћѡ
Kazachiy Brod and akhshtyr’ are con-
nected over the Mzymta river by a small foot-
bridge, but they are following dramatically 
divergent paths in terms of government at-
tention and development. the original road 
linking adler to Krasnaya Polyana runs west 
of the river, through Kazachiy Brod. this 
road has been vital to the village. It has been 
paved since Soviet times and has always had 
bus service. In contrast, the main link between 
akhshtyr’ and adler is a poorly-maintained 
dirt road. Because their own infrastructure is 
lacking or nonexistent, residents of akhshtyr’ 
routinely cross the footbridge to Kazachiy 
Brod to shop or to commute to the urban cen-
ters. 
ȃȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ
¢ȱ¢ǯȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱ
 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
 ǯȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱȱȱ ȱ.” 
(author interview: Kazachiy Brod resi-
ȱȃȄǰȱȱŘśǰȱŘŖŗřǯǼ
figure 2. Locals walking in Kazachiy Brod in 2013. New 
houses, new fences, new streetlights. 
figure 3. Houses on the construction road to akhshtyr’ in 
2013. New power lines and towers.
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 despite the presence of a few small shops 
in Kazachiy Brod, both villages shared a com-
mon, relatively low level of infrastructural 
development: both villages had dirt roads 
in poor condition, ramshackle houses with 
asbestos roofs, and cows could be seen wan-
dering even on the main road. further, both 
ȱȱȱȱĜȱ ȱ
the lack of public infrastructure. to this day, 
neither village has a connection to a municipal 
ȱǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
or via propane tanks, and houses are typically 
heated by wood-burning stoves. Until very 
recently, the water in Kazachiy Brod was not 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱěǲȱȱȱȱ
money, they would have drinking water deliv-
ered by truck. akhshtyr’ had no water connec-
tion at all, but some of the fortunate residents 
had their own wells. Neither village could rely 
on the electricity supply and blackouts were a 
fact of life. these rural villages were not keep-
ing pace with the urban seaside in terms of ac-
cess to basic goods and services. this was the 
general living situation before the Olympics 
were announced in 2007. 
Situated along the only transport corridor 
between the two Olympic clusters, the people 
in these villages theoretically stood to gain tre-
mendous material advantages from the boom 
in development and tourism. Indeed, when 
it was announced that Sochi would host the 
Olympics, many residents expressed opti-
mism, and some even made plans for business 
ventures.8 
8  author interview: Pogos antonyan, akh-
¢ȂǰȱȱŚǰȱŘŖŖŝǲȱȱ Ǳȱ£¢ȱ
ȱȱȃ
ȄǰȱȱŝǰȱŘŖŖŝǲȱȱ-
 Ǳȱ£¢ȱȱ ȱȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŗǰȱŘŖŗřǯȱ
юѧюѐѕіѦȱ џќёǱȱ ќќњіћєȱ юћёȱћџђѐ-
ќєћіѧюяљђ
the existence of the road in Kazachiy 
Brod has fundamentally altered the village 
since Olympic construction began. On the way 
to Krasnaya Polyana, every piece of construc-
tion equipment and every worker has passed 
through Kazachiy Brod. the quiet country 
village has been transformed into a loud, tur-
ȱǰȱ ęȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ĝǰȱ
tourists, new stores, new houses, and a host of 
unfamiliar faces. 
ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ £ȱ
ǽ¢ȱ¢ȱȱǾȱȱȱ¢ȱŘŚȱ
hours a day. There’s dust everywhere, dust from 
ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ ȱ
the windowsill in the morning and in the afternoon 
it’s covered in dust again.” (author interview: 
£¢ȱȱȱȃȄǰȱȱŘǰȱŘŖŗřǯǼ
ȃȂȱ¢ȱĴȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ £ȱ ¢ȱ
anymore.” (author interview: Kazachiy Brod 
ȱȃ
ȄǰȱȱŘǰȱŘŖŗřǯǼ
ȃǰȱ ȱ ȱ¢¢ȱȱ£¢ȱǯȱ
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱȱ ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ Ǿȱ
and there were no strangers. Nowadays, there are 
ȱ¢ ǯȱ	ȱ ȱȱȱȱ
houses that didn’t exist two years ago.” (author 
Ǳȱ £¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȄȱ
ȱȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŗŞǰȱŘŖŗřǯǼ
a power substation was built on the 
banks of the Mzymta between the two villag-
es. When construction began, workers started 
shopping at arut, the main store in Kazachiy 
Brod. In the village itself, new houses with 
rooms for rent appeared on lots that had once 
ȱęǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
their property and sold the parcels. these 
houses are sometimes occupied by extended 
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members of local families (itself a sign of in-
creasing wealth in the area), but residents still 
complain about the number of Olympic work-
ers renting rooms.9 
the village now has a pharmacy and a 
shop for mobile phones, and ground was bro-
ken for a small shopping center - all unimagi-
nable developments a few years ago. Local 
reaction to this increased activity is mixed. 
¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
some store owners are enjoying a boom. the 
situation is more nuanced for other residents, 
however. Short of renting out housing, there 
ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱĚ¡ȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱ
people focus on the immediately noticeable 
negative changes to their environment.
ȃ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
day this summer. Sometimes we sit all day without 
power.”10
ȃȂȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱ
ǯȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
śǱřŖȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĜǯ”11
ȃȂȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱ
 ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯ”12
ȃLet the Olympics be over! We are being tor-
tured here.”13
9  author interview: Kazachiy Brod resident 
ȃȄǰȱ¢ȱřǰȱŘŖŗřǯ
10  author interview: Kazachiy Brod resi-
ȱȃȄǰȱȱŘǰȱŘŖŗřǯ
11  author interview: Kazachiy Brod resi-
ȱȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŗǰȱŘŖŗřǯȱ
12  author interview: Kazachiy Brod resi-
ȱȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŘǰȱŘŖŗřǯȱ
13  author interview: Kazachiy Brod resi-
ȱȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŚǰȱŘŖŗřǯ
It is worth noting that not everyone enter-
tains such negative views, though the general 
mood in the village does seem pessimistic and 
harassed. Locals who are currently employed 
ȱ¢ȱȱȬȱȱȱęȱ
directly - have more positive opinions about 
the developments in the region.14 
New improvements in the village include 
the installation of streetlights and the laying 
ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ-
lage has been provided with public light and 
a source of potable water. It seems logical to 
credit Olympic infrastructure development for 
these improvements, but it has not yet been 
ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱ
causal relationship. 
On the eve of the Olympics, Kazachiy 
Brod remains a village in confused transi-
tion. despite some positive changes, people 
ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ-
frastructure and access to resources, and they 
are tired of the endless construction activity. 
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ¢ǯȱ
the streets are in terrible condition and the 
culture of the village has been altered by the 
appearance of strangers. Ongoing construc-
tion is loud, disruptive, omnipresent, and re-
lentless. at the same time, it is not accurate to 
say that material life has not improved. there 
is enough money for many people to improve 
their properties or to build new houses. there 
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ ȱ
and the streets, though poorly maintained, 
are now lit at night. there are shops and res-
taurants being built. People in Kazachiy Brod 
have legitimate complaints about the changes 
ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ęȱ
from some of those changes. In sum, it appears 
ȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
14  author interview: Kazachiy Brod worker 
ȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŗǰȱŘŖŗřǯ
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not enough to outweigh the disruptions they 
are forced to endure.
јѕѠѕѡѦџȂǱȱюџєіћюљіѧђёȱюћёȱђѠѝђџ-
юѡђ
as part of the preparation for the Olym-
pic Games, a new federal highway was built 
between adler and Krasnaya Polyana, run-
ning along the east side of the river, approxi-
mately 500m from the village of akhshtyr’. In 
the original planning documents, akhshtyr’ 
was to have access to this highway using an 
onramp, as shown in figure 4. 
Naturally, the people living in akhshtyr’ 
 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱ ȃȱ ȱ
means life, and a good road means a good 
life.”15 
15  author interview: akhshtyr’ resident 
ȃȄǰȱȱŘǰȱŘŖŗřǯ
 the onramp was never built. In response, 
ȱĴȱĴȱȱȱȱ-
cal administrators, including the mayor of 
Sochi and executives in OlympStroy, the State 
Corporation responsible for the construction 
of Olympic venues. their concerns have not 
been addressed. 
ȃWe explained that there is a situation here 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȂȱĴȱ ȱ
there was an onramp planned. There’s nothing 
here now. Everyone says there’s no money. The 
plan changed. But who changed these plans? No 
one ever wants to give us a real answer. They’ve 
told us, ‘wait until the Olympics are over. Then 
you’ll get everything you want.’ But there is never 
anything concrete.” (author interview: Pogos 
antonyan, akhshtyr’, august 2, 2013.)
ȱĴǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ
dug on the northern side of akhshtyr’, and a 
construction road was built through the vil-
figure 4. federal highway marked in blue, onramp to akhshtyr’ marked in red. 
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lage (see figure 5). the presence of the quarry 
is highly disturbing to residents. the drilling 
noise is ceaseless and can even be heard across 
the river in Kazachiy Brod, but in akhshtyr’ 
it is oppressive and inescapable. Work contin-
ues at night by the light of powerful spotlights. 
this activity creates a constant cloud of pul-
verized rock dust which is a daily disturbance 
to villagers. finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the quarry itself represents the illegal 
destruction of a staggering amount of protect-
ed wilderness in a national park. Complaints 
from local residents and environmental activ-
ists have brought about no results.16
another problem confronting the people 
in akhshtyr’ is the lack of water. Many fami-
lies had personal water wells which were de-
16  author conversation: akhshtyr’ resident 
ȃȄȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŘŘǰȱ
2013.
stroyed by the appearance of heavy industry 
in the area. 
ȃ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ
ȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ ęȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱ
comes again. But after Olympic construction is 
ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱǵȱ
 ȱ
will we go on? They drilled new wells but no water 
came up.” (author interview: akhshtyr’ resi-
ȱȃȄǰȱȱŗǰȱŘŖŗřǯǼ
In protest, the residents of akhshtyr’ de-
cided to block the federal 
highway and alerted the 
media. One young wom-
an explained the results:
ȃThe evening before we 
were planning to close the 
highway, the police came 
around to every house in 
¢Ȃǯȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȁ-
ten, if you go out onto the 
 ¢ǰȱ  Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ
you away. Just don’t say we 
Ȃȱ  ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ
feel free to go out onto the 
highway tomorrow if you 
want, but don’t be surprised 
 ȱ ¢ȱ  ȱ Ȃȱ -
ing to happen.’” (author in-
 Ǳȱ¢ȂȱȱȃȄǰȱ¢ȱŘŘǰȱŘŖŗřǯǼ
In the end the residents succumbed to 
this pressure and stayed home. No vocal 
protest took place, though people continue 
ȱ  ȱ Ĵǯȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŗřǰȱ ¢Ȃȱ
residents learned that the authorities plan to 
use the quarry as a dump for construction de-
bris. Currently they are circulating a petition 
against this plan, but they are not optimistic. 
the general opinion in akhshtyr’ regarding 
figure 5. New quarry, set against the backdrop of the 
houses of akhshtyr’, 2013. 
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the Olympics can be summed up in the words 
of a man who lives in a house overlooking the 
new quarry: 
ȃI am very disappointed. There was supposed 
ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢Ȃȱȱ-
£¢ȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
to the federal highway. There was supposed to be 
gas, water, electricity, internet. All the things for a 
normal life. Nothing happened. There’s no money 
for us. They’re spending millions but there’s no 
money here for the things they promised us.” (au-
ȱ Ǳȱ¢ȱȱȃȄǰȱȱ
4, 2013.)
Locals are particularly frustrated by the 
unaccessible highway so close to their village, 
and they worry about their access to water 
after the Olympics are complete. People in 
¢Ȃȱȱę¢ȱ£ǰȱȱ
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ęȱ ȱȱ
the Olympics. On the contrary, by almost any 
measure, their lives have grown dramatically 
worse. 
ќћѐљѢѠіќћ
In examining the experiences of villagers 
in Kazachiy Brod and akhshtyr’, this paper 
Ĵȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ordinary life during mega-development in a 
rural area. despite sharing a common spatial 
bond and social history, the two villages have 
diverged wildly since Olympic construction 
began. People in Kazachiy Brod have legiti-
mate complaints about development even as 
they build houses and businesses and ben-
ęȱȱȱȱǯȱ
across the river, people in akhshtyr’ have en-
dured the loss of their water supply, the con-
struction of an illegal quarry, and the threat 
ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ
ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ
in their developmental trajectories, people in 
both villages are united by their almost uni-
versal desire for the Olympics to end.
the divergence between the two villages 
can be traced to the uneven distribution of 
resources, itself due to the historical legacy 
of the original road between adler and Kras-
naya Polyana. the existence of this paved 
ȱȱȱȱěȱ ȱ
the villages. Because of its location along this 
road, Kazachiy Brod has been the recipient of 
ȱ ȱ Ĵǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
noticeable material changes in the lives of its 
residents. despite the fact that residents’ opin-
ions are generally negative, no one can reason-
ably argue that people in Kazachiy Brod are 
 ȱěȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
akhshtyr’.
 In contrast to Kazachiy Brod, akhshtyr’ 
does not enjoy direct access to an important 
paved road. Indeed, the residents of akhshtyr’ 
traditionally have left their village and walked 
across the river into Kazachiy Brod to access 
ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ
and shopping. In context of Olympic develop-
ment, this unequal relationship has become 
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rock that is used to build Olympic infrastruc-
ture is taken from akhshtyr’, and the process 
of drilling that rock is hugely disruptive to lo-
cal residents. further, the construction equip-
ment and heavy trucks that are necessary for 
this operation are responsible for destroying 
the village’s wells and removing their access 
to potable water sources. finally, the newly-
built federal highway which could have inte-
grated akhshtyr’ into the region runs past the 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱěǯȱȱȱ
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in recent development between akhshtyr’ and 
Kazachiy Brod is the original paved road. the 
existence of this road in Kazachiy Brod con-
nects the village to certain fruits of Olympic 
development, while the lack of this road has 
left akhshtyr’ with no water, no reliable tran-
sit links, and the promise of an Olympic dump 
once construction is complete. 
 Using the opinions and reactions of local 
residents as the foundation for investigation, 
this work focuses on the geographical and 
ȱ ěȱ  ȱ ȱ
two villages in order to bring a more nuanced 
approach to the understanding of mega-event 
development in rural areas. Mega-events are 
not only about infrastructure improvements, 
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they are also about individual lives and land 
in the context of dramatic upheaval. Examin-
ing the micro level contributes to a more com-
plete picture of the complex changes inherent 
in mega-development. against the backdrop 
of events held in a spirit of international unity, 
there should be no room for local people to 
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